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Abstract 
We study a policy response to an increase in post-merger social stress. If a merger of groups 
of people is viewed as a revision of their social space, then the merger alters people’s 
comparators and increases social stress: the social stress of a merged population is greater 
than the sum of the levels of social stress of the constituent populations when apart. We use 
social stress as a proxy measure for looming social protest. As a response to the post-merger 
increase in social stress, we consider a policy aimed at reversing the negative effect of the 
merger by bringing the social stress of the merged population back to the sum of the pre-
merger levels of social stress of the constituent populations when apart. We present, in the 
form of an algorithm, a cost-effective policy response which is publicly financed and does not 
reduce the incomes of the members of the merged population. We then compare the financial 
cost of implementing such a policy when the merger involves more or fewer groups. We show 
that the cost may fall as the number of merging groups rises.  
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1. Introduction 
It has been shown that when integration is viewed as a revision of social space and, thereby, 
of people’s set of comparators, integration increases the population-wide social stress 
measured by aggregate relative deprivation: the social stress of an integrated population is 
higher than the sum of the levels of social stress of the constituent populations when apart 
(Stark, 2013). Governments must be aware that an increase in social stress could translate into 
social unrest, and there have been plenty of episodes, historical and current, to remind them of 
the short distance between social stress and social protest, and between social protest and 
social upheaval. We therefore view social stress as a proxy measure for looming social 
protest.  
In the context of the current paper, integration takes place as a consequence of 
political, administrative, communication technology, military, and other processes. For 
example, the internet, mobile phones, social media, and other modern means of 
communication help to integrate groups of people (not merely facilitate coordination between 
them), intensifying interpersonal comparisons. Provinces consolidate into regions, and small 
municipalities merge into a larger municipality (as is currently happening increasingly in Italy 
and in Japan). Adjacent villages that experience population growth coalesce into one town. 
East Germany and West Germany become united Germany. And European countries integrate 
financially by adopting a common currency; although a “super-government” does not take 
over from national governments, a body is formed - the European Central Bank - which takes 
on some of the functions of a national government.1 Wars and conquests can join together 
regions, nations, and peoples.  
Rising social stress can cascade into social unrest. A government seeking to forestall a 
possible social protest can respond to the increase in social stress, but the response will not be 
cost-free. If a government is to maintain social stress at the pre-merger level in order to 
counteract any looming protest, it will have to allocate funds to placate the integrated, more 
                                               
1 It is noteworthy that the introduction of a common currency is an instrument of fundamental change in 
economic and social relations in general, and in interpersonal comparisons of earnings, pay, and incomes in 
particular. Although, prior to the introduction of the euro as a common currency, individuals in specific 
European countries were able to compare their incomes with the incomes of individuals in other European 
countries, the comparison was not immediate, it required effort to convert incomes denominated in different 
currencies, and it was presumably not done very often. When a single currency is introduced, the comparison 
environment changes, easing, indeed inviting, comparisons with others. For example, with currency unification, 
workers who perform the same task and who are employed by a manufacturer with plants located in different 
European Monetary Union countries can compare their earnings with each other directly, effortlessly, and 
routinely. 
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distressed population. The main, and surprising, result reported in this paper is that the 
minimum funds required for keeping the post-merger level of social stress at its pre-merger 
level may decrease with the number of the integrating groups involved. When more groups 
merge, the increase in social stress and the minimum funds needed to contain this increase can 
move either in the same direction, or in opposite directions. One implication of this result is 
that when, in response to looming social protest, a government seeks to discourage the 
coming together of more groups, it may well need to rethink its stance: discouraging wider 
protest may exacerbate the associated financial burden rather than alleviate it.  
It is not the purpose of this paper to present a menu of governmental responses to a 
rising social stress and / or to assess the relative feasibility of such responses. Suffice to 
remark that perhaps the very processes that bring about the expansion of social space may 
make devolution a rather ineffective response. The purpose of this paper is defined more 
narrowly: to show how a government that seeks to respond to post-merger intensified social 
stress by disbursing funds can optimize this disbursement, and how the amount expended 
relates to the number of groups joining.  
The toolkit at the disposal of governments that can be applied to preserve social peace 
and maintain social order can obviously range from granting political rights and expanding 
general welfare programs to repression and the use of police and other coercive powers. As 
already noted, it is unlikely that any policy response will be costless. Nor is it clear whether 
concessions, if granted, will not signal weakness and encourage stronger protest. The analysis 
undertaken in this paper calculates the lowest price tag of one specific policy response. 
Hence, when assessing how to react, a government will be able to compare the outlay 
involved in other measures with the precise outlay specified here. 
In the next section we present a measure of social stress, and the superadditivity 
theorem which shows that the social stress of a merged population is greater than the sum of 
the levels of social stress of the constituent populations when apart. For the sake of 
completeness, we present in the Appendix the rationale and logic for the measure of social 
stress that we use in this paper. In Section 3 we construct an algorithm for a cost-effective 
government response. In Section 4 we show that the expenditure needed to keep the post-
merger social stress at its pre-merger level can either increase or decrease with the number of 
the merging groups. In Section 5 we conclude.  
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2. Relative deprivation as a measure of social stress, and the superadditivity of aggregate 
relative deprivation  
We quantify the social stress of a population by the sum of the levels of social stress 
experienced by the individuals who constitute that population. As in Stark (2013), we 
measure the social stress of an individual by his relative deprivation. In line with the 
definition of relative deprivation in Stark (2013), we resort to income-based comparisons, 
namely an individual feels relatively deprived when others in his comparison group earn more 
than he does. To concentrate on essentials, we assume that the comparison group of each 
individual consists of all members of his population. Thus, we measure the social stress of an 
individual by the extra income units that others in the population have, we sum up these 
excesses, and we divide the sum by the size of the population. This approach tracks the 
seminal work of Runciman (1966) and its articulation by Yitzhaki (1979), Hey and Lambert 
(1980), Ebert and Moyes (2000), and Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2006). Summing over the 
levels of relative deprivation (social stress) experienced by all the individuals belonging to a 
given population yields the social stress of the population. We refer to this sum as the 
aggregate relative deprivation (ARD) of the population.  
Formally, for population P consisting of n  individuals whose incomes are represented 
by the following ordered vector ( )1,..., nx x x= , where 1 2 ... nxx x≤ ≤ ≤ , we define the relative 
deprivation of individual i, RDi, earning income ix  as 
 ( ) 1
           1,..., 1, 
 
                  
1
           
( )
0   .
n
j i
j ii
x x
nRD x
for i n
for i n
= +
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−#
≡ %
= −
=#&
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To ease the analysis that follows, an alternative representation of the relative deprivation 
measure is helpful. 
Lemma 1. Let ( )iF x  be the fraction of the individuals in population P of size n  with an 
ordered income vector ( )1,..., nx x x=  whose incomes are smaller than or equal to ix . The 
relative deprivation of individual i P∈  earning ix , where i n< , is equal to the fraction of 
those whose incomes are higher than ix  times their mean excess income. Namely  
 ( ) ( )1 ( ) |i i i iRD x F x E x x x x! "# $= − ⋅ − > . (2) 
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Proof. We multiply 1
n
 in (1) by the number of the individuals who earn more than ix , and we 
divide ( )
1
j
n
i
i
j
x x
= +
−∑  in (1) by the same number. We then obtain two ratios: the first is the 
fraction of the population who earn more than individual i, namely 1 ( )iF x! "# $− ; the second is 
the mean excess income, namely ( )|i iE x x x x− > . □ 
The aggregate relative deprivation of population P, PARD , is the sum of the levels of 
relative deprivation experienced by the individuals belonging to P, that is,   
 ( )
1
n
P
i
i
ARD RD x
=
=∑ ( )
1 1
1 n n
i j i
j ix xn = = +
= −∑∑ . (3) 
PARD  is our measure of the level of social stress of population P.  
We now consider two populations, A of size An , and B of size Bn , with ordered 
income vectors ( )1 ,..., kk k knx x x= , where ,k A B= . When these two populations merge, the 
total population size is A Bn n n= + . The ordered income vector of the merged population is 
denoted by A Bx x , and is the n-dimensional income vector obtained by merging the two 
income vectors and ordering the resulting n components from the lowest to the highest. 
In the following claim we state that in comparison with the sum of the levels of 
aggregate relative deprivation of two populations when apart, a merger of the two populations 
increases the aggregate relative deprivation or leaves it unchanged. Namely if we 
conceptualize the merger of two income vectors as an addition operator, then ARD is a 
superadditive function of the income vectors.2  
Claim 1. We denote by A BARD ∪  the aggregate relative deprivation in a population that 
constitutes the merger of population A and population B. Then, A B A BARD ARD ARD∪ ≥ + . 
Proof. A proof for the case of the merger of two populations with two members each is in 
Stark (2010); a proof for the case of the merger of two populations of any size is in Stark 
(2013).  
Consider now 2l ≥  merging populations, where l  is a natural number. The size of 
each constituent population kP  is kn , where 1,...,k l= , and the corresponding ordered vector 
                                               
2 A function H is superadditive if for all x, y it satisfies ( ) ( ) ( ) 0H x y H x H y− − ≥+ . 
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of incomes is ( )1 ,..., kk k knx x x= . The merged population is then of size 1 ln n n= +…+ , and its 
ordered income vector is 1 lPPx x… . 
Corollary. The aggregate relative deprivation of the merged population exhibits the 
superadditivity property, namely 1 1 1 1... ...l l l lP P P P P PARD ARD ARD+ +∪ ∪ ∪ ∪ ∪≥ + . 
Proof. The proof is by induction with respect to the number of the merged populations.  
 
3. A cost-effective policy response to the post-merger increase in social stress 
An increase in social stress brought about by a merger can translate into social unrest, which 
may subsequently lead to social protest. We now ask how a government that is concerned 
about the increase in social stress will be able to respond in a cost-effective manner in order to 
obviate possible social protest.  
We study a publicly-financed, cost-effective policy aimed at counteracting the 
increase in social stress. We consider the following target for a government policy that seeks 
to reverse the deleterious effect of the merger: to bring down the aggregate level of relative 
deprivation of the merged population to a level equal to the sum of the pre-merger levels of 
aggregate relative deprivation of the constituent populations when apart. Naturally, the 
government is keen to minimize the cost of implementing its chosen policy, which it enacts 
subject to the condition that, in the process, no income of any member of the merged 
population is allowed to fall.3 We refer to this problem as Π . We show that the government 
can design an optimal policy response to the post-merger increase in aggregate relative 
deprivation by choosing carefully a subset of the individuals for whom the marginal increase 
in income yields the highest marginal decrease in relative deprivation.  
Consider a merged population N of size n with an ordered income vector 
( )1,..., nx x x= . We denote by Ω  a subset of individuals from N whose incomes are the 
lowest. We analyze what happens when marginally, and by the same amount, we increase the 
incomes of the individuals in Ω , where a marginal increase refers to such an increase that the 
incomes of these individuals will not become higher than the income of any individual outside 
the set Ω . 
                                               
3 We resort to the condition “no income is allowed to fall” because of an implicit assumption that an individual’s 
utility depends positively on his income and negatively on his relative deprivation, although we do not know the 
exact rate of substitution between income and relative deprivation. For example, we do not know how much 
income we could take away from an individual whose relative deprivation falls in the wake of the merger. 
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First, suppose that the set Ω  consists of just one individual out of the n members of 
the merged population, meaning that there is only one individual earning the lowest income; 
that is, 1 ix x<  for 2,...,i n= . Suppose that the government appropriates a sum ε  to increase 
the income of this lowest-earning individual (namely individual 1), where ε  is small enough 
to satisfy our definition of a marginal increase in income; that is, 2 1x xε ≤ − . Using (2), this 
individual’s relative deprivation decreases by 1n
n
ε
− , because the mean excess income of the 
fraction of 1n
n
−  individuals earning more than him is reduced by the amount ε . At the same 
time, as this individual’s income was, and continues to be, the lowest in the population, this 
expenditure does not increase the relative deprivation of any other individual belonging to N. 
Therefore, the change in the aggregate relative deprivation of the merged population is equal 
to the decrease in the relative deprivation of individual 1, namely  
 1N nARD
n
ε
−
Δ = − . (4) 
We next show that upon spending ε  on a single individual, the term on the right hand 
side of (4) is the highest marginal decrease in aggregate relative deprivation achievable. We 
do this by contradiction. Suppose that we were to increase by ε  not the income of the lowest-
earning individual, 1x , but, rather, the income of an individual earning 1ix x> , where i N∈  
and 1i > , such that 1i ix xε ++ ≤ , so as to abide by the condition of a marginal change. Then, 
the relative deprivation of individual i would decrease as a result of his income getting closer 
to the incomes of the individuals earning more than he does, but the relative deprivation of 
those individuals who earn less than individual i would increase. Namely when in  ( in ) is the 
number of the individuals earning strictly more (less) than ix , the change in the aggregate 
relative deprivation of the merged population would be  
 i i i iN n n n nARD
n n n
ε ε ε
−
Δ = − + = − , (5) 
because the mean excess income of the fraction of in
n
 individuals earning more than ix  
would fall by the amount ε , yet, at the same time, the relative deprivation of each of the in  
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individuals earning less than ix  would increase by n
ε . Because 1in ≥  and in n< , comparing 
(4) and (5) yields 
 1i in n n
n n
ε ε
− −
< . (6) 
Thus, channeling the transfer ε  to an individual who is not the lowest income recipient in the 
merged population yields a lower decrease in aggregate relative deprivation than increasing 
by ε  the income of the individual who earns the lowest income. 
Second, we consider a merged population N in which there are several individuals who 
earn the same income which constitutes the lowest income in the population. Hence, the set 
Ω  includes more than one individual. We denote by Ω  the size of this set. Suppose again 
that the government appropriates the sum ε  to increase the earnings of each member of the 
subset Ω  by ε
Ω
. Because every member of Ω  receives a transfer of the same amount, the 
aggregate relative deprivation of the individuals belonging to Ω  does not change.4 Thus, the 
change in the aggregate relative deprivation in N arises only from a decrease of the relative 
deprivation sensed by the lowest-earning individuals in Ω  whose incomes become closer to 
the incomes of the individuals earning more than they do. The fraction of the individuals in N 
who earn more than members of the set Ω  is equal to 
n
n
− Ω
, and the mean excess income of 
each individual who receives the transfer is reduced by ε
Ω
. Therefore, each of the members 
of Ω  experiences a decrease in his relative deprivation equal to 
n
n
ε− Ω
Ω
. With no 
individual in N experiencing an increase in his relative deprivation (which occurs because the 
transfer ε
Ω
 marginally increases the incomes of the lowest-earning individuals) this 
expenditure yields the following change in the aggregate relative deprivation:  
                                               
4 If the set Ω  were expanded to include several individuals who differ in their income levels, then, in the wake of 
the transfer under consideration, the aggregate relative deprivation of the individuals belonging to Ω  would also 
not change. Upon each of the individuals in Ω  receiving the positive transfer 
ε
Ω
, their incomes increase by the 
same amount and, thus, the aggregate relative deprivation within the set Ω  does not change. 
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 NARD
n n
n n
ε
ε
− Ω − Ω
Ω −Δ =
Ω
= − . (7) 
As in the case of the set Ω  consisting of a single individual, this is obviously the optimal use 
of ε  for any subset of individuals in the merged population. 
Drawing on the preceding protocol, we present the optimal solution to problem Π , 
that is, the cost-effective policy response to the post-merger increase in social stress, in the 
form of an algorithm as follows.  
Algorithm: 
1.! Include in the set Ω  all the individuals who earn the lowest income in the merged 
population. 
2.! Proceed to increase simultaneously the incomes of the members of the set Ω , until 
either 
a.! the aggregate relative deprivation of the merged population is brought down to 
the sum of the pre-merger levels of the aggregate relative deprivation of the 
constituent populations when apart, 
or 
b.! the incomes of the members of the set Ω  reach the income of the lowest-
earning individual(s) who is (are) not a member (members) of this set, in 
which case expand the set Ω  by including him (them) in Ω . Start from step 2 
once again. Notice that the incomes of the pre-expansion members of the set 
Ω  should be increased from the level already reached, that is, from the level 
equal to the income(s) of the newly included individual(s).5 
It is easy to ascertain the optimality of the Algorithm: at each step, we increase the 
incomes of those individuals who earn the least, so the decrease in the aggregate relative 
deprivation of the merged population is most effective, and no one experiences an increase of 
their relative deprivation in the process. We raise incomes from the bottom, and we 
                                               
5 If, in the wake of employing the Algorithm, the set Ω  is expanded to include individuals who prior to the 
government’s transfer differed in their incomes, then, upon transferring funds to the individuals in Ω , the 
aggregate relative deprivation of the merged population falls via two channels. First, the incomes of the 
individuals in Ω  become closer to the incomes of the individuals earning more than they do (namely the 
individuals outside Ω ) and, second, the aggregate relative deprivation within the set Ω  is reduced. The latter 
consequence follows from the fact that the transferred funds equalize the incomes of the individuals belonging to 
Ω  who, prior to the transfer, differed in their incomes. 
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simultaneously gauge the aggregate relative deprivation response. The two processes move in 
tandem, and in opposite directions. The raising of incomes from below is ratcheted up the 
hierarchy of the individuals, and it ceases when the aggregate relative deprivation reaches its 
pre-merger level.  
 
Example 1: Application of the Algorithm  
We consider the merger of populations A and B with income vectors (4,6)Ax =  and 
(2,3)Bx = . The pre-merger levels of aggregate relative deprivation of each population are 
1AARD =  and 1
2
BARD = . Because in the merged population with the ordered income vector 
(2,3 , ),4 6A Bx x =  we have that 13 3
4 2
A B A BARD ARD ARD∪ = > = + , the government seeks 
to lower the aggregate relative deprivation of the merged population back to 
3
2
A BARD ARD+ = .  
Applying the Algorithm, we first include in the set Ω  the individual earning 2, and we 
increase his income. Upon the maximal possible transfer satisfying the condition of a 
marginal change, that is, upon his income reaching the income of the lowest-earning 
individual outside Ω  (namely the individual who earns 3), we obtain the post-transfer income 
vector ( )A B
T
x x = , ,(3 3 4,6)  with  
( ) ( )2 2 6 3 4 3 5
4 2
A B
TARD
∪
+ ⋅ − + −$ %& '= = . 
We see that giving the individual earning 2 an additional unit of income does not suffice to 
bring down the aggregate relative deprivation to its pre-merger level. We, therefore, add the 
next lowest-earning individual (namely the individual who earns 3) to the set Ω , and we 
proceed to simultaneously and equally increase the incomes of each of the two individuals in 
the set Ω . We do so from the level of incomes already reached, that is, we start from each 
individual in Ω  who now has income 3. At the point where these two incomes are elevated to 
4 each, we obtain the income vector ( ) ( )4,4,4,6A B
T
x x =  with  
3 2 3
4 2
A B A B
TARD ARD ARD
∪ ⋅= = = + . 
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Thus, in order to bring the aggregate relative deprivation in the merged population 
down to the sum of the pre-merger levels of aggregate relative deprivation of the constituent 
populations, the government has to transfer 2 to the individual earning 2, and 1 to the 
individual earning 3, which sums up to 3 as the total cost of implementing the policy.  
 
4. The government cost of forestalling increased social stress in relation to the number of 
integrating groups 
We now inquire how the number of integrating groups impinges on what the government 
spends in order to keep the level of social stress at its pre-merger level. We show that this 
financial burden can either increase or decrease with the number of merging groups. Claim 2 
states that when more groups merge, the increase in social stress and the minimum funds 
needed to contain this increase can move either in the same direction or in opposite directions. 
The “breakdown” in the intuitive logic is caused by the fact that the superadditivity property 
that characterizes the increase in social stress upon the merger of 1n +  populations as 
opposed to the merger of n populations does not replicate onto the domain of the 
government’s financing. In other words, subadditivity of the government financial cost can 
coincide with superadditivity of social stress.6  
Claim 2. Not allowing any individual’s income to be reduced, the minimum funds required 
for keeping post-merger social stress at its pre-merger level do not necessarily increase with 
the number of integrating groups (populations).  
Proof. By means of two examples, we show that two opposite directions of a change in the 
government expenditure are possible. In each example, we consider three populations, A, B, 
and C, with income distributions of the same type, in that, income-wise, population A and 
population B do not overlap, whereas population C overlaps with populations A and B. The 
two examples differ only with respect to dispersion of the income distributions. In both 
examples we compare the minimum financial outlay needed to keep at bay the social stress 
when two populations, A and B, merge with that needed to keep at bay the social stress when 
three populations merge, A, B, and C. We show that for the income distributions in the first 
example, the minimum necessary funds are larger when three populations merge than when 
two populations merge, whereas for the income distributions in the second example, the 
                                               
6 A function H is subadditive if for all x, y it satisfies 0( ) ( ) ( )H x H y H x y+ − ≥+ . 
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minimum necessary funds are smaller when three populations merge than when two 
populations merge. 
 
Example 2.1: An increase in the government cost of forestalling increased social stress upon 
the merger of more groups 
Let there be populations A, B, and C of two individuals each, with income vectors 
( 3 , 5 )Ax a aε ε= + + , ( , 2 )Bx a aε ε= + + , and ( , 4 )Cx a a ε= + , where 0a >  and 0ε > . We 
note that for 1a =  and 1ε = , the income distributions of A and B reduce to the distributions 
referred to in Example 1. When the three populations are apart, AARD ε= , 
2
BARD ε= , and 
2CARD ε= . 
We consider first the merger of populations A and B. For the post-merger ordered 
income vector ( 2 3 , 5, ),A Bx x a a a aε ε ε ε= + + + + ,  
13 6
4 4
A B A BARD ARD ARDε ε∪ = > = + . 
In order to bring, at the minimum cost, the ARD of the merged population down to the pre-
merger level of the sum of the levels of ARD of the constituent populations without lowering 
the income of any individual belonging to the merged population, the government’s transfer 
has to yield the income vector of the merged population 
( ) ( )3 , 3 , 3 , 5A B
T
x x a a a aε ε ε ε= + + + + , which requires funds of 3ε . Then, indeed, we 
obtain that 6
4
A B A B
TARD ARD ARDε
∪ = = + . 
We now consider the merger of the three populations, A, B, and C. The ordered 
income vector of the merged population is 
( ), 2 3 , 4 ,, 5,A B Cx x x a a a a a aε ε ε ε ε= + + + + + , and  
35 21 .
6 6
A B C A B CARD ARD ARD ARDε ε∪ ∪ = > = + +  
Employing the Algorithm, we derive the optimal post-transfer income vector of the merged 
population ( ) 19 19 19, , , 3 , 4 , 59 9 9
A B C
T
x x x a a a a a aε ε ε ε ε ε" #= + + + + + +$ %
& '
, as then,  
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21
6
A B C A B C
TARD ARD ARD ARDε
∪ ∪ = = + + . 
In order to keep the social stress of the integrated population at its pre-merger level without 
lowering the income of any individual, the government needs to spend minimum  
19 19 19 10 12 3
9 9 9 3 3
ε ε ε ε ε ε ε" # " #+ − + − = =% & % &
' ( ' (
. 
Because 13
3
ε  is higher than 3ε , it follows that the strain on the government’s 
finances is more severe when three populations, A, B, and C, merge than when two 
populations, A and B, merge.  
 
Example 2.2: A decrease in the government cost of forestalling increased social stress upon 
the merger of more groups 
Let there be populations A, B, and C of two individuals each, with income vectors 
( 4 , 8 )Ax a aε ε= + + , ( 2 , 3 )Bx a aε ε= + + , and ( , 6 )Cx a a ε= + , where 0a >  and 0ε > . 
Then, when the three populations are apart, 2AARD ε= , 
2
BARD ε= , and 3CARD ε= .  
We consider first the merger of populations A and B. For the post-merger ordered 
income vector ( 2 , 3 , 4 , 8 )A Bx x a a a aε ε ε ε= + + + + , 
19 10
4 4
.A B A BARD ARD ARDε ε∪ += > =  
In order to keep the social stress of the integrated population at its pre-merger level without 
the income of any individual being reduced, we again follow the Algorithm’s method of 
increasing incomes “from the bottom.” The cost-effective government response requires 
transferring funds to the three lowest-earning individuals by raising their incomes to the 
common level of 14
3
a ε+ . Thus, the optimal, post-transfer income vector of the merged 
population is ( ) 14 14 14, , , 83 3 3
A B
T
x x a a a aε ε ε ε" #= + + + +$ %
& '
 and, indeed, we obtain that  
10
4
.A B A BTARD ARD ARD
∪ = = +  
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This policy response requires spending 14 14 142 3 4 5
3 3 3
ε ε ε ε ε ε ε" # " # " #− + − + − =% & % & % &
' ( ' ( ' (
, which 
constitutes the lowest possible cost of the policy of keeping at bay the ARD after the merger 
of populations A and B. 
We now consider the merger of the three populations, A, B, and C, with the post-
merger ordered income vector ( ), 2 , 3 , 4 , 6 , 8A B Cx x x a a a a a aε ε ε ε ε= + + + + + . We have 
that 
53 33 .
6 6
A B C A B CARD ARD ARD ARDε ε∪ ∪ = > = + +  
In order to bring the social stress of the merged population down to its pre-merger level, we 
invoke the Algorithm and increase incomes “from the bottom.” We stop doing so upon 
assigning the income of 29
9
a ε+  to each of the three lowest-earning individuals. This yields 
the post-transfer income vector   
( ) 29 29 29( , , , 4 , 6 , 8 )9 9 9
A B C
T
x x x a a a a a aε ε ε ε ε ε= + + + + + +  
and then, indeed, 
33 .
6
A B C A B C
TARD ARD ARD ARDε
∪ ∪ = = + +  
In sum, this policy increases the government’s spending aimed at keeping at bay the 
ARD of the three merged populations, A, B, and C, by 
29 29 29 14 22 3 4
9 9 9 3 3
ε ε ε ε ε ε ε" # " #+ − + − = =% & % &
' ( ' (
, which is less than 5ε , the spending required 
to keep at bay the ARD of the two merged populations, A and B.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The integration of populations is often a process that in and by itself governments have little 
or no means to control. Social stress, caused by integration and measured by aggregate 
relative deprivation, is subject to superadditivity: the social stress in the integrated population 
increases as compared to the sum of the levels of the social stress in the constituent 
populations when apart. The corresponding minimum financial outlay needed to reduce the 
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post-merger social stress to its pre-merger level does not necessarily share a similar property. 
In fact, this outlay can be subject to subadditivity.  
The consequence of increased aggregate relative deprivation can be dire. Gurr (1970, 
p. 12) writes: “Discontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the basic, 
instigating condition for participants in collective violence.” He is also of the opinion (p. ix) 
that “to understand protest and rebellion in general, … we should analyze … popular 
discontent (relative deprivation) … and the government’s capacity to repress or channel 
[people’s] anger.” Interestingly, Gurr argues (p. 24) that “the potential for collective violence 
varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a 
collectivity.” However, Gurr does not study or develop the quantitative perspective that is the 
focus of our paper. 
There is an intriguing similarity between the mechanism of our Algorithm, which aims 
at increasing social welfare via the reduction of aggregate relative deprivation, and the 
Rawlsian program which aims at increasing social welfare directly. The Rawlsian approach to 
social welfare, built on the foundation of the “veil of ignorance,”7 measures the welfare of a 
society by the wellbeing of the worst-off individual (the maximin criterion). Rawls argues that 
if individuals were to select the concept of justice by which a society is to be regulated 
without knowing their position in that society - the “veil of ignorance” - they would choose 
principles that involve the least undesirable condition for the worst-off member over 
utilitarian principles. This hypothetical contract is the basis of the Rawlsian society, and of the 
Rawlsian maximin social welfare function. To see vividly the analogy between our Algorithm 
and the Rawlsian welfare-increasing policy, we revisit Example 1 where the post-merger 
ordered income vector is (2,3 , ),4 6A Bx x = , and the pre-merger sum of the levels of the 
aggregate relative deprivation of the two populations is 3/2.   
Consider a Rawlsian social planner who seeks to increase social welfare by adhering 
to the maximin principle and who has at his disposal three units of income. This planner will 
allocate the first unit of income to the individual who earns 2; the income vector will then 
become (3,3,4,6). Thereafter, the Rawlsian social planner will reach out to the now worst off, 
namely to the two individuals who earn 3 each, and increase the incomes of each of them to 4, 
thereby obtaining income vector (4,4,4,6). Clearly, as the allocation proceeds, the identity of 
the worst off individuals changes (first it is the individual whose income was initially 2, then 
                                               
7 “[N]o one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the 
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like.” (Rawls, 1999, p. 118.) 
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these are the two individuals whose incomes were initially 2 and 3). However, the principle 
guiding the allocation of the income available for disbursement does not change: the sequence 
of attending to the individuals is from the bottom up. And this procedure is analogous to the 
one specified by our Algorithm. 
Naturally, there are differences between the Rawlsian procedure and the Algorithm 
protocol in that the rationales for interference differ, and the reasons for proceeding from the 
bottom up differ. Still, in the configuration of Example 1, a Rawlsian social planner with a 
“policy budget” of three units of income will allocate those units in the same way as will a 
government applying our Algorithm.  
An interesting question is to what extent the likelihood of implementing our Algorithm 
depends on the degree of autocratic power that a government has. Given the view in political 
economy that autocratic governmental power hinders civic participation, it could be 
anticipated that individuals in autocratically governed societies will not be inclined to resort 
to collective action. Consequently, social protest will not be likely, and a governmental 
response will not be required. However, the inevitability of such a scenario has been doubted 
by Acemoglu et al. (2014) who, drawing on the example of Sierra Leone, conclude that an 
autocratically governed society can hold large scale community meetings, exhibit intensive 
participation in social groups, and frequently undertake collective action. This conclusion 
implies that even in such societies, “integrate and protest” can well occur and, therefore, the 
need for governmental response cannot be assumed away. 
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Appendix. The rationale and construction of the measure of social stress  
Several recent insightful studies in social psychology (for example, Callan et al., 2011; Smith 
et al., 2012) document how sensing relative deprivation impacts negatively on personal 
wellbeing, but these studies do not provide a calibrating procedure; a sign is not a magnitude. 
For the purpose of constructing a measure, a natural starting point is the work of Runciman 
(1966), who argued that an individual has an unpleasant sense of being relatively deprived 
when he lacks a desired good and perceives that others with whom he naturally compares 
himself possess that good. Runciman (1966, p. 19) writes as follows: “The more people a man 
sees promoted when he is not promoted himself, the more people he may compare himself 
with in a situation where the comparison will make him feel deprived,” thus implying that the 
deprivation from not having, say, income y is an increasing function of the fraction of people 
in the individual’s reference group who have y. To aid intuition and for the sake of 
concreteness, we resort to income-based comparisons, namely an individual feels relatively 
deprived when others in his comparison group earn more than he does. An implicit 
assumption here is that the earnings of others are publicly known. Alternatively, we can think 
of consumption, which could be more publicly visible than income, although these two 
variables can reasonably be assumed to be strongly positively correlated.  
As an illustration of the relationship between the fraction of people possessing income 
y and the deprivation of an individual lacking y, consider a population (reference group) of six 
individuals with incomes {1,2,6,6,6,8}. Imagine a furniture store that in three distinct 
compartments sells chairs, armchairs, and sofas. An income of 2 allows you to buy a chair. To 
be able to buy any armchair, you need an income that is a little bit higher than 2. To buy any 
sofa, you need an income that is a little bit higher than 6. Thus, when you go to the store and 
your income is 2, what are you “deprived of?” The answer is “of armchairs,” and “of sofas.” 
Mathematically, this deprivation can be represented by ( 2)(6 2) ( 6)(8 6)P Y P Y> − + > − , 
where ( )iP Y y>  stands for the fraction of those in the population whose income is higher 
than iy , for 2,6iy = . The reason for this representation is that when you have an income of 2, 
you cannot afford anything in the compartment that sells armchairs, and you cannot afford 
anything in the compartment that sells sofas. Because not all those who are to your right in the 
ascendingly ordered income distribution can afford to buy a sofa, yet they can all afford to 
buy armchairs, a breakdown into the two (weighted) terms ( 2)(6 2)P Y > −  and 
( 6)(8 6)P Y > −  is needed. This way, we get to the very essence of the measure of RD used in 
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this paper: we take into account the fraction of the comparison group (population) who 
possess some good which you do not, and we weigh this fraction by the “excess value” of that 
good. Because income enables an individual to afford the consumption of certain goods, we 
refer to comparisons based on income. 
Formally, let 1( ,..., )my y y=  be the vector of incomes in a population of size n with 
relative incidences ( )p y = ( )1( ),..., ( )mp y p y , where m n≤  is the number of distinct income 
levels in y. The RD of an individual earning iy  is defined as the weighted sum of the excesses 
of incomes higher than iy  such that each excess is weighted by its relative incidence, namely    
                                               ( ) ( )( )
j i
i j j i
y y
RD y p y y y
>
≡ −∑ .                                         (A1) 
In the example given above with income distribution {1,2,6,6,6,8}, we have that the vector of 
incomes is ( )1,2,6,8y = , and that the corresponding relative incidences are 
1 1 3 1( ) , , ,
6 6 6 6
p y ! "= # $
% &
. Therefore, the RD of the individual earning 2 is 
( )( ) (6)(6 2) (8)(8 2)
ij
j j i
y y
p y y y p p
>
− = − + −∑ 3 14 6 36 6= ⋅ + ⋅ = . By similar calculations, we 
have that the RD of the individual earning 1 is higher and is equal to 53
6
, and that the RD of 
each of the individuals earning 6 is lower and is equal to 1
3
. 
We expand the vector y  to include incomes with their possible respective repetitions, 
that is, we include each iy  as many times as its incidence dictates, and we assume that the 
incomes are ascendingly ordered, that is, 1( ,..., )ny y y=  such that 1 2 ... nyy y≤ ≤ ≤ . In this 
case, the relative incidence of each iy , ( )ip y , is 1/ n , and, (A1) becomes exactly as given in 
(1):  
( ) 1
           1,..., 1, 
 
                  
1
           
( )
0   .
n
j i
j ii
y y
nRD y
for i n
for i n
= +
!
−#
≡ %
= −
=#&
∑  
Looking at incomes in a large population, we can model the distribution of incomes as 
a random variable Y over the domain [0, )∞  with a cumulative distribution function F. We can 
then express the RD of an individual earning iy  as  
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                                          ( ) [ ] ( )1 ( ) |i i i iRD y F y E Y y Y y= − − > .                                  (A2) 
The formula in (A2) is quite revealing because it casts RD in a richer light than the 
ordinal measure of rank, which have been studied intensively in sociology and beyond. The 
formula informs us that when the income of individual A is, say, 10, and that of individual B 
is, say, 16, the RD of individual A is higher than when the income of individual B is 15, even 
though, in both cases, the rank of individual A in the income hierarchy is second. The formula 
also informs us that more RD is sensed by an individual whose income is 10 when the income 
of another is 14 (RD is 2) than when the income of each of four others is 11 (RD is 4
5
), even 
though the excess income in both cases is 4. This property aligns nicely with intuition: it is 
more painful (more stress is experienced) when the income of half of the population in 
question is 40 percent higher, than when the income of 4
5
 of the population is 10 percent 
higher. In addition, the formula in (A2) reveals that even though RD is sensed by looking to 
the right of the income distribution, it is impacted by events taking place on the left of the 
income distribution. For example, an exit from the population of a low-income individual 
increases the RD of higher-income individuals (other than the richest) because the weight that 
the latter attach to the difference between the incomes of individuals “richer” than themselves 
and their own income rises. The often cited example from a three tenors concert organized for 
Wembley Stadium in which Pavarotti reputedly did not care how much he was paid so long as 
it was one pound more than Domingo was paid does not invalidate the logic behind our 
measure because, in light of the measure, Pavarotti’s payment request can be interpreted as 
being aimed at ensuring that no RD will be experienced when he looks to the right in the pay 
distribution.  
Similar reasoning can explain the demand for positional goods (Hirsch, 1976). The 
standard explanation is that this demand arises from the unique value of positional goods in 
elevating the social standing of their owners (“These goods [are] sought after because they 
compare favorably with others in their class.” Frank, 1985, p. 7). The distaste for relative 
deprivation offers another explanation: by acquiring a positional good, an individual shields 
himself from being leapfrogged by others which, if that were to happen, would expose him to 
RD. Seen this way, a positional good is a form of insurance against experiencing RD. 
There can, of course, be other, quite intuitive ways of gauging RD, and in some 
contexts and for some applications, a measure simpler than (1) can be adequate. Suppose that 
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an individual’s income is I, and the average income of the individual’s reference group is R. 
We can then define RD as a function of I and R, namely 
 
if
( , )
0   if .
R I I R
RD I R
I R
− <"
= #
≥%
 (A3) 
This representation captures the intuitive requirements 
( ) ( ), ,0,  0  for RD I R RD I R R I
I R
∂ ∂
< > >
∂ ∂
, 
namely that, holding other things the same, for a relatively deprived individual (that is, for an 
individual whose income is lower than the average income of the individual’s reference 
group), RD decreases with his own income, and increases with the average income of his 
reference group. Examples of the use of (A3) are in Fan and Stark (2007), Stark and Fan 
(2011), and Stark and Jakubek (2013). However, the advantage of using (1) is that it is based 
on an axiomatic foundation which is, essentially, a translation of Runciman’s (1966) work, let 
alone that it is nice in economics to draw on a foundation laid out in social psychology. 
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